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EXTENT TO WHICH COURTS UNDER THE
RULE MAKING POWER MAY PRE-
SCRIBE RULES OF EVIDENCE
GEORGE H. SEEFELD*
D URING the last decade American legislatures and courts have
responded with enthusiasm to the cry for reassertion by the
courts of the rule-making powers. Engendered by the inadequacy of
elaborate codes, and encouraged by the assurances of legal scholars,
rules purporting to regulate practice and procedure have been adopted
without hesitancy. Conjectures as to their validity have been resolved
by decisions declaring the existence of constitutional powers to make
such rules.
A detailed study of the principles of constitutional law which have
been invoked to sustain the rule-making power would be unnecessary
as well as out of place in this discussion. Conceding the existence of
such power, we, nevertheless, should direct some attention to one limi-
tation which seems to be universally recognized. This is the principle
that no power exists in the courts to make rules which affect substan-
tive rights.' Like many other principles this one is more easily stated
than applied. Rules which clearly related to the mechanics of court
conduct were accepted almost without question. As a result, the prac-
tice, procedure and conduct of courts have formed the verdant field in
which the exercise of the rule-making power has been permitted full
sway. English judicial history offers justification for such regulation,2
and in fact the very origin of the rule-making power lies in the neces-
sity of ego-centric regulation of judicial functions.3
Granting the validity of the above limitation for the time being,
the question as to which rules of evidence may be created and modified
under the rule-making power is not easily answered. It is apparent at
once that any answer is impossible if rules of evidence are considered
categorically without separate analysis. The general classification "evi-
dence" has some rules which so affect substantive rights as to prevent
the use of judicial rule-making power either to create or modify them.
Failure to recognize this fundamental proposition may account, at
least in part, for the conflict which exists among opinions of judges as
* Member of the Milwaukee bar.
I In re Constitutionality of Statute Empowering Supreme Court to Promulgate
Rules, 204 Wis. 501, 236 N.W. 717 (1931); Washington-South Navigation Co.
v. Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Co., 263 U.S. 629, 44 Sup. Ct. 220, 68
L.Ed. 480 (1924). Other cases asserting this doctrine are legion.
2 Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A. B. A. J. 599, 601 (1926).
3 Tyler, The Origin of the Rule-Making Power, 22 A. B. A. J. 772, 773 (1936).
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well as scholars. The question has often arisen where courts have been
called upon to interpret statutes granting power to make rules regu-
lating "procedure." Generally the term has been considered broad
enough to include evidence, and justification for this view may be
found in the fact that many so-called rules of evidence are procedural
in their nature.4 Among such are found rules relating to burden of
proof and inferences of guilt from failure to testify. Clearly, any expo-
sition of the power of judges to make rules covering matters of evi-
dence must begin with an analysis of the scope of what is known as the
law of evidence.
I.
Analytic definitions of evidence are rarely found in legal tomes,
undoubtedly because of the great difficulty encountered in their formu-
lation. In a simple form one definition has characterized the word
"evidence" as a relative term which signifies the relation between a
proposition to be established and the material demonstration of that
proposition.5 The proposition of which evidence may be offered is de-
fined and limited by the rules of substantive law and pleading.
A perusal of the ldnds of questions generally classified as ques-
tions of evidence indicates that at least four groups6 are fairly well
outlined. They may be stated as follows:-
A. What facts may be presented as evidence?
B. By whom must evidence be presented?
C. To whom must evidence be presented?
D. Of what propositions in issue need no evidence be presented?
In strictness, the first group above is the only group which involves
evidentiary questions. They center about the admissibility of offered
facts and thus fall within our definition. On the other hand, the rest
of the groups set out in the foregoing list are really concerned with
larger aspects of procedure and find their way into the general classi-
fication of rules of evidence only because their material is chiefly evi-
dential and because they are constantly being treated as problems of
evidence. Consider, for example, the question of burden of proof. It
is closely tied in with the question of who shall open and close the
argument, which is a question of procedure. One of the classes of
rules relating to burden of proof is that relating to judicial notice, yet
most courts, as well as most text writers, include that topic as properly
one of evidence.
4 Callahan and Ferguson, Evidence and the New Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 45 YALE L. J. 622 ff. (1936).
'5 WIGMOE, EVIDENCE, (1904 ed.) p. 5, par. 2, Introduction. See also, Lapham v.
Marshall, 51 Hun. (N.Y.) 561, 3 N.Y. Supp. 601, 603 (1889).
6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, (1904 ed.) pp. 8, 9, Introduction.
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In some respects many questions which fall within the above men-
tioned groups B, C, and D, as well as many so-called procedural points,
have an indirect bearing upon the admissibility of evidence. To the
extent that they affect admissibility, they are properly considered rules
of evidence. However, for purposes of discussion of the application of
the rule-making power, those rules which deal primarily with pro-
cedural questions, and only secondarily affect evidentiary principles,
should be sustained under the recognized power of the courts to regu-
late matters of procedure and practice.
Thus, such subjects as burden of proof, presumptions, relation be-
tween judge and jury,7 judicial notice, and judicial admissions, all of
which involve larger aspects of procedure and are independent of the
evidential material, should be subject to the rule-making power., Justi-
fication is found for this proposition in the comparison of advantage
and disadvantage of exercise of that power.
First, the members of the bench are much better able to determine
whether judicial notice, for instance, should be taken of constantly
changing facts." They are the closest observers of the way in which
rules are working under the pressure of application to ever-different
cases. They can discover the chance inequities of placing the burden of
going forward with the evidence upon one or the other of the parties
and can more readily adjust the rules to meet such problems.
Secondly, they can receive and act with facility and intelligence
upon suggestions from members of the bar regarding possible improve-
ments. This is a nearly impossible feat for legislatures, especially since
many details receive legislative attention because of the personal inter-
est of some legislators, while other more important details escape
attentfbn because of lack of a sponsor.
Lastly, knowing the intent and purpose of the rule, the jurist will
be able to give it an understanding interpretation.
On the other hand, the fears of the objectors that the courts have
no time to make rules and no disposition to make any rules, or only
convenient ones, have already been dispelled by the excellent applica-
tions of the rule-making power appearing wherever it is encouraged.
Adequate protection against abuse lies in such constitutional safe-
guards as due process of law, right to jury trial, and others well known
to all.
7 This does not refer to the right to jury trial. In so far as questions of division
of functions between judge and jury interfere with the right to a jury trial
they are, of course, unconstitutional and so not properly within the control
of the rule-making power. Cleveland Ry. v. Halliday, 127 Ohio 278, 188 N.E.
1 (1933).
s A rule which provided that the court must instruct the jury that no inference
of guilt arises from failure of accused to testify was upheld. State v. Pave-
lich, 163 Wash. 379, 279 Pac. 1102 (1929).
9 Consider the recent economic depression, for instance.
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II.
Our major problem revolves around that group of evidentiary prin-
ciples relating to admissibility. The rules of evidence dealing with ad-
missibility are intrinsically the only rules properly classified under the
subject of "Evidence." These form a larger and more important group
than any thus far- considered.
For purposes of study of the rule-maling power as applicable to
this part of the law of evidence, four subdivisions have been adopted.
They are:-
A. Rules relating to relevancy.
B. Rules relating to privilege.
C. Rules relating to secondary limitations.
D. Parol Evidence Rule.
A. RELEVANCY
The problem of proof involves at the outset a question as to whether
or not a fact offered has any value as an indication of the existence of
the ultimate facts to be proved. This question of admissibility originates
because of the separation between judge and jury. The former assumes
the role of watch-dog to prevent any evidence being introduced which
is not worth considering. In addition, the judge is the preliminary tester
whose duty it is to see that the matters introduced have an appreciable
value in the proof of the proposition at issue. This function has caused
the growth of a vast number of rules which are characterized as relat-
ing to relevancy. They are the united logic of a great many judges and
lawyers in a great many instances in which the bearing of particular
facts on particular issues has been repeatedly discussed and decided.10
Circumstantial evidence has played the most important part in a
large percentage of cases. If it were not for the great latitude allowed
in the reception of such evidence, it would be impossible to prove many
justified claims. By nature it is indirect and gains its force through
references deducible from prior experience alone, from reason alone,
or from-both experience and reason. The relevancy of such evidence is
not dependent upon the conclusiveness of such inferences, but merely
upon a determination that the inferences reasonably drawn tend to a
slight degree or more to elucidate or assist in a final determination of
a disputed fact. For example, proof of good character of the defendant
in criminal cases is permitted to evidence the improbability of his doing
the act charged.
So long as the jury remains in use as an integral part of the court
system, the need for sifting circumstantial evidence will remain. Jury-
men, unused to the fine discriminations as well as the persuasive tac-
o State v. Lapage, 57 N.H. 245, 288 (1876).
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tics of lawyers, cannot do this for themselves. Advocates of the jury
system would be prone to indulge in the excess precaution of keeping
the power out of the hands of judges to control the relevancy of cir-
cumstantial evidence by rules of court. Their argument is that to con-
trol the relevancy of offered proof is to have a power approaching dic-
tatorship and to destroy the effectiveness of the jury. This is particu-
larly true in their opinion since the right to appeal may bring the case
before the very court which has created the rule, thus minimizing the
possibility of non-partisan treatment of objections to the rule.
The underlying reasons center about the general principle hereto-
fore mentioned that the courts cannot make rules which control sub-
stantive rights, yet we see a host of administrative boards and com-
missions given wide powers of rule-making, some of which include
working out the details of substantive law. It must be apparent that
the idea of not affecting substantive law by rules of court is tied to
some purpose. That purpose, though not expressed, is the protection
of the jury system. The theory seems to be that if the judges were
given rule-making power over substantive law, besides having power
to control practice and procedure, it would be an easy matter for the
courts so to control the proof that the jury might be forced to reach a
decision predetermined by judicial opinion.
There are indications on every side that the jury system is fast
losing its popularity. The reason for this need not be discussed here-
but the effect on the law of evidence is bound to be far-reaching. With
the present strong tendency to simplify issues by prior disclosure and
concession of facts, to get at the kernel of the dispute as quickly as
possible, the need for strict rules of evidence controlling relevancy of
circumstantial evidence is not present.-' If confidence can be placed in
the competency and attentiveness of judges, and there is no reason in
experience why it shouldn't, no fear need arise that the balance of
government will be upset or democratic institutions impaired. Admin-
istrative boards or commissions have functioned under such relaxed
rules with no menacing results of that kind.
A discussion of the principles of relevancy would not be complete
without consideration of those covering testimonial evidence. In deter-
mining the admissibility of testimonial assertions, the judge again plays
the role of preserver and protector of the jury, his first task being to
determine if the assertion is prima facie worth considering. In making
this decision he must decide whether sanity, experience, knowledge,
"1This tendency is shown in cases sustaining rules which require affidavits
denying certain facts in order to put the plaintiff to proof of such facts:
Odenheimer v. Stokes, 5 Watts & S. (Pa.) 175 (1843) ; Mills v. Bank of United
States, 11 Wheat 431, 6 L.Ed. 512 (1826); Fox v. Conway Fire Ins. Co., 53
Me. 107 (1865) ; Hellfrich v. Greenbarg, 206 Pa. 516, 56 Atl. 45 (1903).
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etc., of the witness warrant the trustworthiness of the offered state-
ment of facts.
Such questions as mental derangement or immaturity of the wit-
ness and experiential capacity are within the discretion of the judge.
They involve observation of the witness and consideration of particu-
lar peculiarities in different cases, matters which cannot be adequately
covered in detail by statutes. As to such questions there should be no
doubt that, whether or not jury trial is involved, they are particularly
suited to rules of court. The experience of judges in daily contact with
witnesses fits them exceptionally well for the duty of making such
rules.
The common law early developed extensive rules of disqualifica-
tion of witnesses largely because of the assumption that persons having
a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case would be likely to speak
falsely, and consequently their testimony should be excluded entirely.
Realizing the error in that assumption, statutes have been passed modi-
fying or removing entirely the disqualification of interest and relating
it to credibility.
Again the question arises whether or not such matters should not
be left to the judge. With the waning frequency of jury trials, the
need "for statutory control lessens. The trend toward increased respon-
sibility on the part of judges is part of a larger tendency to make the
judiciary a really independent and separate branch of government.1 2
Experience shows that such responsibility has not been misused and
has resulted in greater flexibility in the treatment of individual cases.
This is particularly true when impeachment and counter-impeachment
are made subject to the rule-making power.
The last type of evidence to be considered from the point of view
of relevancy is real evidence. This kind of evidence differs from cir-
cumstantial and testimonial evidence in that it does not require an
inference to be drawn from one fact to prove another. The very nature
of this type of evidence eliminates the necessity of restrictions and pre-
liminary inquiries involved in the two kinds of evidence previously con-
sidered. However, such limitations as unfair prejudice in a criminal
case, or in a civil personal injury case, indecency, physical or mechani-
cal inconvenience of production, are variously present in individual
cases. In jury cases the judge is best able to decide whether such limi-
tations should operate, depending upon the individual circumstances.
In non-jury trials, the purpose of such limitations is largely lost, except
in the case of physical or mechanical inconvenience or impossibility.
Adequate statutory control over such limitations would be practically
an impossibility. In fact, control by rules of court would also be very
12 McCormick, Tornorrovwls Law of Evidence, 24 A. B. A. J. 507, ff. (1938).
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difficult, due to the diversity of situations in which real evidence might
be offered. Certainly the better of the two courses would be to extend
the rule-making power to cover these rules of evidence.
B. PRIVILEGE
Closely associated with the duty of witnesses to respond to com-
pulsory process and reply to questions asked, are the privileges at-
tached to certain topics and communications. These privileges are char-
acterized as personal in the sense that they may be claimed or waived
by the parties to whom they are extended.
The privileges, covering such subjects as spouses testifying against
each other, self-incrimination, and communication between attorney
and client, are obscurely rooted in the 16th and 17th centuries. Com-
munications between physician and patient and priest and penitent have
become privileged by statute. The justification for many of them is
just as obscure as their origin. If the need for determining the true
facts in the administration of justice is balanced against the protection
of a relationship or condition by such privilege, a reasonable basis for
the existence of many privileges will be found wanting. Yet changes by
statutory enactments have been infrequent.
From the historical point of view it is obvious that recognition and
development of privileges was a matter of judicial opinion and decision
on questions of practice. To deny the right of modern courts to make
rules covering such matters is to deny the established criterion for
determining whether a power is legislative, executive or judicial.13
C. SECONDARY LIMITATIONS
This group is comprised of those rules which apply specific safe-
guards to meet special dangers after evidence has satisfied the require-
ment of relevancy. Among them are preferential rules requiring docu-
mentary originals and attesting witnesses, the hearsay rule, rules re-
quiring oath and publicity, the opinion rule, and rules relating to kinds
and numbers of witnesses.1 4
By the beginning of the 19th century, the rule requiring production
of original documents was crystallized and distinct from the rule of
profert in pleading from which it developed. It has suffered little
change during the last century largely because common sense and long
experience have dictated the simple and obvious reasons for its exist-
ence. Control over it by rules of court has been justified by the declara-
tion that it is a regulation of the conduct of the business of the court.'15
is State v. Pavelich, supra, Note 8.
14 A rule which required explanation for calling every witness over 15 in number
was held invalid. State v. Gideon, 119 Mo. 100, 24 S.W. 748 (1893).
15 Sellars v. Carpenter, 27 Me. 497 (1877). But where common law limitations
on documentary proof are increased by court rules, such rules are frowned
upon. Patterson v. Winn, 5 Pet. (U.S.) 233, 8 L.Ed. 108 (1831); Pelz v.
Bollinger, 180 Mo. 252, 79 S.W. 146 (1904).
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One distinct feature of preferential evidence is that other evidence
may be admitted if the preferred evidence cannot be introduced. To
determine when and under what conditions such "secondary" evi-
dence may be admitted should be entirely within the rule-making power
of the court. Such questions depend largely upon the circumstances of
individual cases and are best controlled and decided by the judges under
their general duty to pass upon admissibility.
The hearsay rule is based upon two of the most vital features of
our law-namely, the right of cross-examination and confrontation.
Ever since the early 1700's it has been recognized as a settled rule,
though exceptions to it have been numerous. Its theory is that many
sources of error and undisclosed facts may be brought to light if the
person whose assertion is offered as evidence is cross-examined. The
theory of the exceptions is that, where necessary, evidence which has
some trustworthiness through force of circumstances will be admitted
though it would otherwise be inadmissible as hearsay.
Considerations such as these are peculiarly suited to the judicial
mind. The rule and its exceptions were developed by conscientious
jurists in an effort to get the true facts as nearly as possible. Is there
any reason to fear that judges of this day and age would not exercise
the same care and attention if they were given the power to make
rules governing the hearsay principle? The rigor with which the rule
has been adhered to is due in great part to the interest in preserving
the right of trial by jury. As such interest weakens, added reason is
found for permitting the judge to determine the extent and scope of
the rule.
As already noted, the principal considerations of a judge in deter-
mining admissibility involve protection against influencing the jury
by untrustworthy evidence. The same considerations have led to the
development of rules relating to oath, publicity and opinions. The
latter rule owes its existence primarily to the fear of usurping the
function of the jurors as the only persons of the judicial scheme outside
of expert witnesses who are privileged to draw inferences from facts.
Its soundest justifications now lie in the necessity of saving time and
avoiding confusion in court hearings. Such matters should also be
within the control of the judges.
D. PAROL EVIDENcE RULE
Confusion has often arisen in legal theories because of the laxity
in the use, if not complete absence, of legal terminology. Frequently a
rule of substantive law is given the appearance of a rule of evidence
because its operation is phrased in terms of prohibiting proof. The
parol evidence rule falls within that class of rules. It is really a rule
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of substantive law which declares certain kinds of facts legally ineffec-
tive. It does not exclude facts because they are untrustworthy or un-
desirable means of evidencing some fact in issue.16 For the above rea-
son we need give no further consideration to this rule.
CONCLUSION
If the premise is accepted that no exercise of the rule-making power
can affect substantive rights, it becomes necessary at once to decide
whether or not rules of evidence are part of the substantive law. The
trend of opinion seems to be that the substantive law does not include
what may strictly be called rules of evidence. Assuming the correct-
ness of that opinion, the conclusion is reached that rules of evidence
are properly controlled by rules of court under the now generally
accepted power to regulate the procedure and practice of courts by
such rules. Exercise of such power is justified by the clear preponder-
ance of the advantages over the disadvantages.
The theory that rules of court cannot affect the substantive law
appears very early in the judicial history of this country. Undoubtedly
it owes its inception to the doctrine of separation of powers. An
exact, well defined line of demarcation between each of said powers
has been found impossible in the practical operation of government.
A certain fusion of powers in various agencies of government has
been found the most productive means for dealing with the ever-
growing mass of governmental business. In the judicial branch, the
gradually increasing disuse of the jury has operated to relax the
rigid separation of intra-court functions. The pressure of work has
not only added to the necessity of expeditiously reaching and disposing
of the essential issues, but of controlling in some measure the substan-
tive rights of the parties. Logic alone cannot fix definite limits for
such control. The recognition of substantive rights created by common
law decisions, and the crystallization of such rights into rules of law
by the doctrine of precedents is proof of some power in the courts to
regulate and control substantive rights.' 7 Pragmatic factors must shape
the outlines of such control during the course of experience.
16 4 WiGMORE, EVIDENCE, (1904 ed.), § 2400; THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON
EVIDENCE AT COMMON LAW (1898), 409; McCormick, Parol Evidence Rule as
a Procedural Device, 41 YA.E L. 3. 365 ff. (1931).
17 Gertner, The Inherent Power of Courts to Make Rules, 10 U. oF IN. L. REv.
33 (1936) ; Wigmore, Editorial Note, 23 ILL. L. REV. 276 (1928).
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